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ABSTRACT 
In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard argues that in order to avoid the threat of moral skep-
ticism, our moral theories must show how the claims they make about the nature of our actions obligate 
us to act morally. A theory that can justify the normativity of morality in this way answers what 
Korsgaard calls “the normative question.” Although Korsgaard claims that only Kantian theories of mo-
rality, such as her own, can answer the normative question, I argue that Adam Smith’s sentimentalist 
moral theory, as presented in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, can answer the normative question as well. 
As a result, it is possible to respond to the moral skeptic in the way Korsgaard outlines without accepting 
some of the theoretical drawbacks of Korsgaard’s own moral theory.  
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1     INTRODUCTION 
Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments1 presents an account of morality that grounds our 
normative behavior in our emotional lives and capacity to sympathize with other people. Smith’s rich de-
scriptions of human emotional states, theoretical insight, and use of intuitive examples from everyday life 
to illustrate key points make his book a classic of enlightenment moral theory. However, in The Sources 
of Normativity,2 Christine Korsgaard argues that sentimentalist moral theories – accounts of moral behav-
ior that, like Smith’s “[argue] that the moral value of actions and objects is a projection of human senti-
ments”3 – cannot ultimately show why we are obligated to act morally. Since sentimentalist moral theo-
ries often claim that our pro-social emotions are the basis of our moral behavior, Korsgaard thinks that 
such theories cannot rationally justify our moral behavior to a skeptical agent who distrusts his or her pro-
social emotions for some reason. Sentimentalist theories of morality thus ultimately fail to answer what 
Korsgaard calls the normative question: the question of why moral claims should obligate us to act in a 
certain way. This is problematic for sentimentalist moral theories because if one cannot justify the norma-
tivity of moral judgments, which binds us to an obligatory course of action, then it is difficult to see why 
anyone should act based on those judgments in the first place.  
In this thesis, I argue that it is, in fact, possible for a sentimentalist theory of morality to answer 
Korsgaard’s normative question. The moral theory that Adam Smith presents in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiment can justify the normativity of morality just as effectively as the Kantian theory Korsgaard ulti-
mately defends. This important because Smith’s view enjoys some major advantages over Korsgaard’s 
theory. His success in answering the normative question means that Korsgaard does not need to resort to 
the Kantian theory she presents in the third lecture of The Sources of Normativity in order to justify our 
                                                          
1
 Smith 2002. Henceforth TMS. When I cite this book, I will note the part, section, chapter, and passage number I 
am referencing, instead of the page number in the edition I’m using. (For example: TMS I.i.i.1.)  
2
 Korsgaard 1996a. Henceforth SN.  When I cite this book, I will refer to the page numbers in the paperback edition 
of it that I’m using. (For example: SN 1.) 
3
 SN 50. 
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moral behavior. She can instead trust that our own natures render moral claims normative, which takes 
much of the pressure off of the project she sets up for herself.  
I will proceed in two main stages. In the first stage, I will give a brief outline of Korsgaard’s ar-
gument in The Sources of Normativity and the theoretical commitments that lead her to endorse the three 
conditions for a satisfactory answer to the normative question that she specifies at the beginning of the 
book (Section 2). In the second stage, I will discuss the key elements of Adam Smith’s moral theory and 
show how it meets all three of the conditions that Korsgaard claims a satisfactory answer to the normative 
question must meet (Section 3). I conclude by outlining some criticisms of Korsgaard’s moral theory and 
showing how Smith’s answer to the normative question might help us keep the attractive elements of 
Korsgaard’s theory, while jettisoning the less appealing elements (Section 4). The theory of normativity 
implicit in Smith’s work is consistent with Korsgaard’s primary theoretical commitments, but embraces a 
less restrictive view of moral reasoning and justification, thus resulting in a more satisfying answer to the 
normative question than the one Korsgaard provides.  
2.   THE NORMATIVE QUESTION: CONDITIONS FOR JUSTIFYING MORALITY  
If we want to assess whether or not Adam Smith can answer the normative question, we first need 
to know what constitutes a successful answer to the normative question. Korsgaard argues that a moral 
theory must satisfy three conditions in order to answer the normative question. First, a good moral theory 
must succeed in addressing someone who occupies “the first-person position of the agent who demands a 
justification of the claims which morality makes upon him.”  In other words, a moral theory should give a 
moral agent faced with an immediate decision a good reason to act morally instead of merely explaining 
why we judge certain actions as moral or immoral. Secondly, a good moral theory must meet a theoretical 
condition commonly called “transparency.”  In order for a moral theory to meet this condition, the moral 
theory in question cannot claim that the true source of our moral motives is concealed from us or that we 
act morally mostly for habitual reasons; we have to be able to willingly decide to be moral.  Thus, if a 
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moral theory claims that that the source of moral normativity lies in factors outside our control, such as 
our evolutionary history or social conventions in a given culture, it fails to answer the normative question. 
Finally, a moral theory that answers the normative question “must appeal, in a deep way, to our sense of 
who we are”  This is because in some situations we might be required to risk a great deal – even our own 
lives – in order to act morally. In order for moral claims to still be normative under those circumstances, 
Korsgaard thinks that something just as important as our own lives must be at stake: our self-conception 
as human beings.  
Korsgaard’s use of these conditions in developing an answer to the normative question leads her 
to endorse a modified version of Kant’s moral philosophy, which she views as the only sort of moral the-
ory consistent with the naturalist claim that value is imposed onto the world by human agents.  However, 
Korsgaard’s use of these conditions also gives us a proverbial checklist that we can use to determine 
whether or not it is possible for a non-Kantian moral theory to answer the normative question. In this sec-
tion, I aim to show how the three conditions Korsgaard thinks a successful answer to the normative ques-
tion must meet reflect some of the deeper theoretical commitments that influence Korsgaard’s discussion 
of the normative question. If this is the case, then demonstrating that Adam Smith can meet all three of 
Korsgaard’s conditions will also suffice as a demonstration that Adam Smith can answer the normative 
question. My discussion of Korsgaard’s moral theory will proceed in three parts. First, I will give a gen-
eral outline of Korsgaard’s project and the moral theory she ultimately ends up endorsing. I will then 
show how Korsgaard’s conditions for answering the normative question draw on the same theoretical 
commitments that inform her moral theory and use those theoretical commitments to provide a deeper 
analysis of Korsgaard’s three conditions. With a clearer picture of Korsgaard’s project in hand, I will con-
clude by turning to her “knavish lawyer” thought experiment, which she takes to be a substantial chal-
lenge to sentimentalist theories of morality, and discussing the specific threat that Korsgaard thinks cases 
of this sort pose to those theories, including Smith’s. 
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2.1. Korsgaard’s Theory of Normativity  
Korsgaard’s interest in the normative question stems from her dissatisfaction with moral theories 
that aim to explain the origin of our moral practices without explaining how moral claims obligate us to 
act a certain way. Many different theoretical explanations of morality are available to us. Some moral 
theorists might claim that morality is the product of God’s commands to us, as revealed by a specific 
prophet or holy texts, while others might claim that it is the result of the same evolutionary forces that 
gave us opposable thumbs. We can judge these sorts of claims about morality by appealing to a standard 
of explanatory adequacy similar to those used to judge scientific theories. However, even if we demon-
strate that a given moral theory tells a plausible story about the natural (or supernatural) forces responsi-
ble for our moral practices, this will not be enough to demonstrate that the claims that morality makes on 
us are justified.  
Let’s say, for example, that a moral theory suggests that our moral practices are largely the result 
of pro-social dispositions that were favorably selected for over millions of years of evolution. This is a 
plausible empirical claim, but it says nothing about why I should face death instead of doing something 
immoral.4 Korsgaard thinks that this consideration introduces a second criterion by which our moral theo-
ries should be judged: that of justificatory adequacy.5 Because morality makes normative claims about 
what we ought to do in certain situations, our theories of morality need to explain why we should heed 
those claims. If a moral theory cannot do that, the result is normative failure; the moral theory in question 
will not be able to provide a clear directive for those who consult it to act a certain way, since it will al-
ways be possible for moral agents to doubt its normative force. So, for instance, if the evolutionary moral 
theory I just mentioned represents the whole truth of morality, Korsgaard does not believe that knowledge 
of this theory can obligate me to do anything, since I can always choose to ignore the pro-social disposi-
tions that the theory claims are responsible for me acting morally.  Korsgaard calls normative failure of 
this sort moral skepticism and devotes the bulk of The Sources of Normativity to addressing it. If a moral 
                                                          
4
 See Nagel 1979a for a longer discussion of this point.   
5
 SN 15. 
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theory can attain justificatory adequacy and overcome the threat posed by moral skepticism, then 
Korsgaard thinks it has satisfactorily answered the normative question.  
Before presenting her answer to the normative question, Korsgaard considers three popular sorts 
of answers to it, all of which she thinks are inadequate. Voluntarism is the view that our moral values are 
externally imposed on us by the command of a legislative authority of some sort – either human or di-
vine.6 Korsgaard thinks that this view fails to answer the normative question because it requires that the 
commands of the legislative authority gain their normative force from the authority’s capacity to punish. 
This is problematic because it entails that if a crime or moral offense goes unpunished, then it is not 
properly a crime or moral offense; whatever the legislative authority allows is good and whatever the leg-
islative authority forbids is bad. In an attempt to solve this sort of problem, moral realists ground the 
normativity of morality in the existence of intrinsically normative entities or facts. Korsgaard thinks that 
this view amounts to failing to even address the normative question at all.7 When faced with the question 
of whether one should be moral, the moral realist can respond by saying “yes”, but cannot give an expla-
nation for why one should act morally without appealing to dubious metaphysical entities.8 Since both 
voluntarism and realism leave room for us to doubt their respective explanations for the normativity of 
morality, neither theory can provide the sort of deep justificatory adequacy that Korsgaard thinks is nec-
essary in a good theory of morality.  
Reflective endorsement theories of morality, such as Hume’s variant of sentimentalism or Ber-
nard Williams’ contemporary variant of virtue ethics, represent something of an improvement over volun-
tarism and realism.9 Theories of this sort defend the normativity of moral claims by showing that morality 
originates in some aspect of our human nature that we should be glad to possess, such as, for instance, our 
innate feelings of sympathy for others. This makes the normativity of moral claims a bit more challenging 
to doubt, since if reflective endorsement theorists are correct, the normativity of morality is not imposed 
                                                          
6
 SN 18. 
7
 SN 39. 
8
 SN 38. 
9
 SN 51.  
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on us by some external force, such as the authority of a sovereign or the existence of a mind-independent 
entity, but is instead the product of our own nature. Although Korsgaard recognizes this particular 
strength of reflective endorsement theories, she still thinks that theories of that sort can still result in nor-
mative failure, since they allow for cases where an agent acts morally only because he can’t help him-
self.10 In these cases, the agent in question would act immorally if he could overcome his innate disposi-
tions, but is unable to do so, which leads him to act morally instead. Moral claims thus fail to gain a nor-
mative grip on agents in these cases, despite their outwardly moral behavior. As a result, Korsgaard thinks 
that reflective endorsement theories of morality cannot answer the normative question. They leave some 
wiggle-room for the moral skeptic to question the normativity of moral claims, even if such questioning 
does not result in immoral behavior.  
In opposition to the theories of morality considered above, Korsgaard endorses a revised version 
of Kant’s moral theory, which grounds the normativity of morality on our capacity for moral reflection. 
The main advantage Korsgaard sees in this strategy is that it shows that the normative claims morality 
makes on us are entailed by the same capacity for reflection that makes moral skepticism possible in the 
first place. If the same basic assumptions that lead one to be a moral skeptic can also demonstrate that 
morality has a normative grip on us, then moral skepticism can be conclusively refuted once and for all 
and the normative question can be satisfactorily answered. Korsgaard does not think that any of the other 
strategies for answering the normative question that she considers are up to this task. Voluntarism fails to 
answer the normative question because we can always ask why the sovereign’s claims are justified. Real-
ism fails to answer the normative question because we can always ask if intrinsically normative entities 
really exist. Reflective endorsement theories fail to answer the normative questions because we can al-
ways ask if we would like to have the sort of nature that the reflective endorsement theorist claims we 
have. Thus, in order to satisfactorily answer the normative question, Korsgaard thinks that we must accept 
some variant of the moral theory she ultimately endorses, which she calls an “appeal to autonomy.”11 
                                                          
10
 SN 88. 
11
 SN 19. 
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Korsgaard’s final theory of moral normativity is fairly sophisticated and incorporates elements of 
voluntarism, realism, and reflective endorsement theories. According to Korsgaard, any reflection on our 
moral activity necessitates a split between the thinking self and the acting self and presupposes that the 
thinking self orders the acting self to do something. This confirms the main insight of voluntarism: that 
norms must be administered to the moral agent by some authority. However, in order for the thinking self 
to administer any norms at all, intrinsically normative entities must exist for it to examine. Taking some 
cues from Wittgenstein and Nagel, Korsgaard claims that reasons are intrinsically normative entities of 
this sort, which makes moral realism fundamentally true as well. For Korsgaard, the sorts of reasons that 
can both motivate us to act and justify us acting in a certain way are ones that take the form of good moral 
maxims. Much like Kant, Korsgaard thinks that a moral maxim is a good one just in case “its internal 
structure…makes it fit to be willed as a [universal] law.”12 Because our capacity for reflection is what 
enables us to determine if the reasons we act on can be willed as laws, Korsgaard takes this capacity to be 
the source of normativity; the common element in all moral agents that enables moral claims to exert 
normative force over us and obligate us to act in a certain way.  
  As a complement to this picture of moral reflection, Korsgaard offers a transcendental argument, 
which she thinks can decisively refute moral skepticism once and for all. As Korsgaard sees it, in order to 
act at all, we must adopt some sort of practical identity: “a description under which [one] finds [one’s] life 
to be worth living and [one’s] actions to be worth undertaking.”13 The practical identities we adopt im-
pose certain norms on us, which in turn structure the sorts of actions we take in given situations. For in-
stance, if I adopt the practical identity of a professional philosopher, then I am motivated to spend large 
amounts of time reading philosophy articles and polishing my philosophical writing, and if I adopt the 
practical identity of a dutiful citizen, then I am motivated to vote in the upcoming election. Although spe-
cific practical identities are contingent insofar as any given person can choose to adopt or not adopt them, 
Korsgaard claims that it is necessary for us to adopt some sort of practical identity. Otherwise, Korsgaard 
                                                          
12
 SN 108. 
13
 SN 101. 
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thinks that we will not have any reason to value anything at all or do anything in particular. Thus, for 
Korsgaard, adopting any specific practical identity necessarily involves adopting a more general practical 
identity: that of a reflective human agent. Since reflection is a characteristic of this general practical iden-
tity, our endorsement of this general practical identity entails that we must endorse the universal laws that 
our thinking self is capable of administering to us 
By showing that normativity of morality is built into the reflective structure of the human mind 
and that we are committed to valuing our capacity for reflection by undertaking any action at all, 
Korsgaard takes herself to have completely eliminated the threat posed by moral skepticism. Korsgaard’s 
theory of moral normativity is specifically designed to provide a definitive answer to the normative ques-
tion and justify the normative claims that morality makes on us once and for all.  
 
2.2 Korsgaard’s Conditions and the Normativity of Reflection 
At first glance, it is not clear how Korsgaard’s project of grounding the normativity of morality 
on our capacity for reflection relates to her three criteria of adequacy. None of Korsgaard’s three condi-
tions explicitly states or requires that moral normativity has anything to do with our ability to reflect on 
reasons for moral action. To make matters worse, Korsgaard’s exposition of the Kantian moral theory that 
she endorses in the third and fourth chapters of The Sources of Normativity does not refer back to the ini-
tial set of conditions she defends at the beginning of the book and instead emphasizes how Kant’s moral 
theory incorporates the main insights of voluntarism, realism, and reflective endorsement theories of mo-
rality. Thus, it’s difficult to see how meeting Korsgaard’s three conditions could guarantee that any given 
moral theory can satisfactorily answer the normative question.  
The best way to resolve this apparent problem is to take a look at Korsgaard’s larger project and 
show how the theoretical commitments that inform Korsgaard’s Kantian moral theory also inform the 
conditions Korsgaard thinks a satisfactory answer to the normative question must meet. If those commit-
ments inform both the conditions that the normative question must meet and the answer Korsgaard gives 
to the normative question, then drawing them out will give us a theoretically consistent picture of her pro-
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ject in The Sources of Normativity: one in which she is both asking and answering the same question 
throughout. This will also give us a clearer sense of how meeting Korsgaard’s conditions might enable 
other moral theories to answer the normative question.  
One of Korsgaard’s main theoretical commitments, which I outlined in the previous section, is a 
hierarchical model of the self, in which the thinking self reflects on reasons for action and administers 
those reasons to the acting self as norms that govern action. Korsgaard largely borrows this conception of 
seflhood, reflection, and agency from Harry Frankfurt’s work on free will, especially Frankfurt’s discus-
sion of the distinction between first-order and second-order desires.14 First-order desires are desires that 
we immediately experience, while second-order desires are desires about our first-order desires. If we can 
endorse one of our first-order desires upon second-order reflection, then Frankfurt would say that we 
identify with that desire; it is a desire that we want to have. Frankfurt claims that the sort of person that 
one is thus informed by the first-order desires that one identifies with and vice versa. For instance, if I am 
a Pink Floyd fan, then I presumably identify with my desire to listen to Pink Floyd frequently and if I 
identify with my desire to listen to Pink Floyd frequently, then I am presumably a Pink Floyd fan. How-
ever, if I compulsively listen to Pink Floyd over and over without really enjoying the music or taking my-
self to be a Pink Floyd fan (thus endorsing my first-order desire to listen to Pink Floyd from a second-
order perspective), then I am not much of a Pink Floyd fan, even if my behavior seems to indicate other-
wise. For Frankfurt, then, our capacity to reflect on our desires and endorse them from a second-order 
perspective is strongly linked to our sense of personal identity and vice versa. Korsgaard’s discussion of 
reflection and practical identity in The Sources of Normativity is in many ways an elaboration on Frank-
furt’s ideas, especially since she sees a strong link between our capacity for reflection and our capacity to 
adopt a practical identity of some sort.  
                                                          
14
 See Frankfurt 1988 for a full exposition of this distinction. Korsgaard doesn’t explicitly mention Frankfurt in the 
main text of SN, but mentions that the connection between her thoughts on reflection and agency and Frankfurt’s 
“should be obvious” in SN 99n8. Also see Cohen 1996, Bratman 1999, and Okrent 1999 for discussions of the simi-
larities between Frankfurt and Korsgaard.  
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Since reasons for action play an important role in Korsgaard’s theory of moral normativity, her 
views on moral motivation are also relevant to her project in The Sources of Normativity. Much like Ber-
nard Williams, 15 Korsgaard defends moral internalism: the thesis that “if someone knows or accepts a 
moral judgment then she must have a motive for acting on it.”16 Korsgaard explores the thesis at length in 
her Kant scholarship from around the same time. In her essay “Kant’s Analysis of Obligation: The Argu-
ment of Groundwork I,”17 Korsgaard reads Kant as claiming that duty can both motivate us to act and re-
quire us to act a certain way, thus providing us with both a reason for action and a motivation to act on 
that reason. Since good actions are those done from the motive of duty, Korsgaard concludes that for 
Kant, “the reason why [an] action is right is a reason for doing it,”18 thus making his theory of moral mo-
tivation strongly internalist. This theory of moral motivation is important for Korsgaard’s argument in 
The Sources of Normativity, since Korsgaard claims that moral norms take the form of reasons that we are 
capable of endorsing upon reflection. If those reasons cannot motivate us to act a certain way, then they 
cannot serve as action-guiding norms, which in turn leads to moral skepticism and normative failure. 
Moral internalism is thus a major assumption in Korsgaard’s theory of moral normativity; without it, mo-
rality may well lose its normative grip on us. In fact, Korsgaard states explicitly that the argument she 
provides in The Sources of Normativity are “operating under [the assumption]… that internalism… is cor-
rect”19 and that she ultimately thinks that “no externalist theory has a chance of establishing [moral] nor-
mativity.”20 
 Now that I have elaborated on two of Korsgaard’s major theoretical commitments, let’s turn back 
to the conditions Korsgaard thinks a satisfactory answer to the normative question must meet and see how 
knowledge of those theoretical commitments helps clarify Korsgaard’s use of those conditions. Given the 
theoretical commitments I have just explicated, Korsgaard’s first condition, which states that moral theo-
                                                          
15
 Williams 1982 . 
16
 Korsgaard 1996b, pg. 43. 
17
 Korsgaard 1996b. 
18
 Korsgaard 1996b, pg. 43. See also Korsgaard 1996e, pg. 316.  
19
 SN 81. 
20
 SN 82n63. 
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ries must directly address someone in “the first-person position of the agent who demands a justification 
of the claims which morality makes upon him,”21 can be read as stating that moral theories must provide 
agents with reasons to act morally that are accessible when those agents reflect on that behavior from a 
second-order perspective. Recall that for Korsgaard, our capacity for moral agency is dependent on our 
capacity to reflect on reasons for action. Since this is the case, if a moral theory succeeds in addressing a 
moral agent, this means that it can provide us with reasons for action that we approve when we reflect on 
them. If a moral theory fails to take our reflective natures into account, then it also fails to take us serious-
ly as moral agents – at least, according to Korsgaard. This is a problem, since the primary goal of any 
moral theory is to tell us what actions to perform; if we are not moral agents, then this goal is impossible 
to meet. Thus, we can best read Korsgaard’s first condition as ensuring that a moral theory provides re-
flective agents with reasons for action and is not trying to trick us into being moral.  
Reading the first condition as ensuring that moral theories provide us with appropriate reasons for 
action helps show why Korsgaard thinks the second condition – that a moral theory provides transparent 
moral reasons – is implied by the first condition.22 Korsgaard borrows the technical term “transparency” 
from Bernard Williams23 and claims that it only applies to moral theories that tell a story about why we 
act morally that we would accept upon reflection. A transparent moral theory thus restricts the sort of rea-
sons that can justify our moral behavior in a special way: namely, by claiming that the only sorts of rea-
sons that can justify moral behavior are ones that an agent could be fully aware of and still be motivated 
to act on. The link between reasons and motivation to act on those reasons that Korsgaard seeks to estab-
lish by introducing the condition of transparency is therefore strongly analogous to the one posited by 
moral internalism, since both moral internalsm and the condition of transparency limit the sorts of ac-
ceptable reasons for action to those that can motivate an agent to act. Reading Korsgaard’s commitment 
to transparency as a way of ensuring that a moral theory will provide something like an internalist account 
of moral motivation is thus a helpful exegetical strategy. It gives us a clearer picture of why Korsgaard 
                                                          
21
 SN 16. 
22
 SN 17. 
23
 SN 17n17. See also Williams 1985, pg. 101.  
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thinks reasons can be normative and, furthermore, demonstrates how that theoretical commitment is im-
plicitly present in Korsgaard’s initial formulation of the normative question.  
Korsgaard’s third condition, which states that a good moral theory “must appeal, in a deep way, 
to our sense of who we are,”24 helps complete the picture of moral normativity established by the other 
two conditions by providing us with a clear strategy for obtaining the sorts of reasons that can motivate a 
moral agent to act morally. Later in the book, Korsgaard reveals that the “sense of who we are” that she 
thinks our moral theories must appeal to is constituted by the practical identities that we adopt; teacher, 
friend, lawyer, and so on. However, on a more general level, Korsgaard’s claim about reasons for action 
gaining motivational force by appealing to our sense of self seems to be largely inspired by Frankfurt’s 
conceptions of identification and personhood.25 As I previously mentioned, Frankfurt thinks that the first-
order desires one identifies with from a second-order perspective are informed by the sort of person one is 
and vice versa. If this is the case, then if we want to convince someone to want to be moral, then it is a 
good strategy to show that acting morally is implicit in being the sort of person that our interlocutor al-
ready takes herself to be. There are a number of ways for a moral theorist to pursue this sort of argumen-
tative strategy. One moral theorist could, for example, follow Korsgaard’s lead and attempt to construct a 
transcendental argument showing that accepting moral norms of some sort are implicit in acting in any 
meaningful way. Another moral theorist could use rhetoric to make her audience feel as though acting 
immorally would be particularly damaging to their self-conceptions as respectable people. The point to 
stress is that a moral theory that meets this condition has a clear way to provide the sorts of reasons that 
can motivate a moral agent to want to be moral, which makes it easier to show how morality can exert a 
normative grip over us.  
The picture of morality and normativity that informs the three conditions Korsgaard lists for a sat-
isfactory answer to the normative question is an attractive one. It emphasizes many aspects of human na-
ture that have historically been held to be significant, including our ability to act based on principles that 
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we reflect upon and our ability to create identities that center around the things, people, and ideas that we 
care about. However, Korsgaard argues that many of the great theories of morality in the Western canon, 
including some forms of sentimentalism, fail to meet her conditions. In the next section, I will outline 
Korsgaard’s attack on sentimentalist theories of morality in further detail and discuss what would need to 
be the case for a sentimentalist theory such as Smith’s to successfully answer the normative question.  
 
2.3 Sentimentalism and Justificatory Adequacy  
So far, nothing I have said about Korsgaard’s theory of moral normativity or the conditions she 
thinks an answer to the normative question must meet specifically precludes Adam Smith from answering 
the normative question. However, it is clear from Korsgaard’s analysis of Hume’s variant of sentimental-
ism in The Sources of Normativity and her discussion of Smith’s sentimentalist theory in other places26 
that this is not an option for her. Much like the theory of morality Hume presents in his Treatise of Hu-
man Nature and other historical and contemporary sentimentalist moral theories, Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments presents an account of morality that grounds our normative behavior in our emotional lives 
and capacity to sympathize with other people. As a result, Smith is often cited as one of the “big three” 
sentimentalist moral philosophers of the enlightenment era, along with Hume and Hutcheson.27 Korsgaard 
notes in her discussions of sentimentalism outside The Sources of Normativity that Smith’s moral theory 
“has more to say about moral motivation”28 and “comes closer to an agent-centered theory [of morali-
ty]”29 than the theories of either Hume or Hutcheson. However, she also notes that for Smith, like other 
sentimentalists, “the approval or disapproval of others is the fundamental moral phenomenon, from which 
all our moral ideas spring,”30 which seemingly places the source of moral normativity in something other 
than the reflective structure of the human mind. This all seems to indicate that, much like Hume’s moral 
                                                          
26
 See especially Korsgaard 1996b, Korsgaard 1996c, and Korsgaard 1996d.  
27
 See, for instance, Harman 2000 and Korsgaard 1996d. 
28
 Korsgaard 1996b, pg. 71n25. 
29
 Korsgaard 1996c, pg. 186n21. 
30
 Korsgaard 1996d, pg. 189. 
14 
 
theory, Smith’s theory should lead to the sort of normative failure Korsgaard brings to light in her “knav-
ish lawyer” thought experiment and, in doing so, fail to answer the normative question.  
Korsgaard’s thought experiment is as follows:  
Our knave is the lawyer for a rich client who has recently died, leaving his money to medical re-
search. In going through the client’s papers, the lawyer discovers a will of a more recent date, 
leaving the money instead to the client’s worthless nephew, who will spend it all on beer and 
comic books. The lawyer could easily suppress this new will, and she is tempted to do so. She is 
also a student of Hume, and believes the theory of the virtues that we find in A Treatise of Human 
Nature. So what does she say to herself?31 
 
According to Korsgaard, the lawyer “says to herself that she would disapprove of herself if she [sup-
pressed the new will].”32 Why would the lawyer disapprove of herself? Because actions of that sort “have 
a general tendency to bring down the whole system of justice.”33 Korsgaard does not think that this is a 
sufficient justification for the knavish lawyer’s moral actions. After all, regardless of whether or not the 
lawyer destroys the will, the whole system of justice does not literally hang in the balance; this is only a 
general rule of morality. As Korsgaard notes, “if [the lawyer] could cure herself of [her moral feelings] 
then that is what she would do.”34 Thus, even if the lawyer’s emotions cause her to act morally, they will 
not have obligated her to act morally and will therefore have failed to exert a genuinely normative power 
over her. Since no one else is present to observe the lawyer’s actions and approve or disapprove of them, 
the lawyer does not seem to have a clear, rational motive to act morally in this case, other than a fear of 
experiencing negative emotions.  
Korsgaard believes that the example of the knavish lawyer brings out a crucial flaw in sentimen-
talist theories of morality. The lawyer “has asked herself whether her feeling of disapproval is really a 
reason – and now I mean a normative reason – not to do the action, and in this case she has found that it 
is not. She only disapproves of justice because it is usually counterproductive.”35 In the absence of any 
reflective justification for moral action, the lawyer’s moral sentiments are all that prevent her from de-
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stroying the will is her conscience. However, if she could simply strip herself of these sentiments and de-
stroy the will anyways, she would. Why, then, should the knavish lawyer be moral in this situation? What 
justifies the claims her moral sentiments make on her? The fact that the lawyer is even asking this ques-
tion demonstrates to Korsgaard that a further justification for moral action is needed. Although Hume’s 
moral theory might show us that the desires we have been conditioned to have are good for us, Korsgaard 
does not think that it can make us genuinely want to be moral in a reflective, second-order sense.  At best, 
all Hume can do is point towards our natural dispositions and persuade us that they are good, thus bypass-
ing the ability to reflect on reasons and act on them that Korsgaard thinks is essential to establishing the 
normativity of morality.  
The “knavish lawyer” thought experiment thus presents a clear, but not insurmountable, challenge 
to Adam Smith’s moral theory. If I wish to claim that Adam Smith can answer the normative question, I 
will have to show that Smith’s theory can provide moral agents with action-guiding moral norms that gain 
their normative force through some sort of reflective process, instead of simply encouraging moral agents 
to approve of the behavior they have been conditioned to perform. This will differentiate Smith’s moral 
theory from Hume and Hutcheson’s theories and thereby exempt it from Korsgaard’s criticisms. If I can 
demonstrate that Smith’s theory both meets all three of Korsgaard’s conditions and can avoid “knavish 
lawyer” cases, then that will be as good evidence as any that Smith’s moral theory can answer the norma-
tive question.   
3. CAN ADAM SMITH ANSWER THE NORMATIVE QUESTION?  
In this chapter, I will outline Adam Smith’s moral theory, as presented in the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments and show how it contains all the conceptual resources necessary to answer the normative ques-
tion. In order to show how Smith might be able to overcome the criticisms Korsgaard levies against sen-
timentalist theories of morality, I will proceed in two main steps. First, I will give a brief overview of 
Smith’s theory of moral judgment, which relies on three basic concepts: the impartial spectator, praise-
16 
 
worthiness, and self-command. I will then systematically discuss how Smith’s use of these and other re-
lated concepts allows his moral theory to meet Korsgaard’s three criteria for a satisfactory answer to the 
normative question. Just like the revised version of Kantianism that Korsgaard ultimately endorses, 
Smith’s moral theory is able to directly address the moral agent, provide that agent with transparent rea-
sons for moral action, and ground our moral behavior in our innate sense of identity and self-worth. Since 
this is the case, Smith should be able to avoid the sort of “knavish lawyer” cases that create problems with 
Hume’s variant of sentimentalism. I will close the section by demonstrating how Smith’s theory can 
avoid the specific criticism that Korsgaard levies against other sentimentalist moral theories.  
 
3.1. Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Judgment   
Adam Smith presents his theory of moral judgment in Parts I-III of the Theory of Moral Senti-
ments.36 In Part I, Smith introduces and elaborates on the two main concepts that form the cornerstone of 
his moral philosophy: sympathy and the imagination.37 Smith uses the word “sympathy” to “denote our 
fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.”38 For Smith, our capacity to sympathize with another person is 
dependent on our capacity to see ourselves in her situation, which he calls the imagination. We use the 
imagination whenever we imagine ourselves in a given situation and see if we can sympathize with the 
actions of the person in that situation. Thus, as D.D. Raphael notes, the use of the imagination that Smith 
details is “more pervasive than the actual experience of sympathy”39 in our everyday practice of moral 
judgment.  
After introducing sympathy and the imagination in the first few pages of the book, Smith spends 
much of the rest of Part I discussing how these two capacities inform our judgments of other people’s 
emotions and actions as proper or improper. For Smith, judgments of propriety or impropriety, when di-
rected at a specific action or sentiment, reflect our capacity to sympathize with the agent given the situa-
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tion she is placed in and are ultimately judgments regarding the motives of an action.40 Thus, if an action 
is judged to be proper, this means that a spectator can sympathize with the motives or sentiments that di-
rect it and vice versa. Likewise, if an action is improper, then this means that it does not “fit” with the 
situation in which it is performed and spectators are unable to sympathize with it.  
Smith further elaborates on the other-regarding aspects of his moral theory in Part II of the Theo-
ry of Moral Sentiments, where he discusses judgments of merit and demerit. For Smith, the amount of 
merit or demerit that we ascribe to someone based on a given action depends largely on the emotions that 
action’s consequences evoke in us. If an action is meritorious, then its consequences lead us to experience 
the emotion that Smith calls gratitude, which makes us want to reward the person who performed that 
action. Likewise, if an action’s consequences make us feel resentment towards the person who preformed 
it, then we wish to punish that person and the action in question is demeritorious.41 Smith’s account of 
judgments of merit and demerit, along with the account of the account of judgments of propriety and im-
propriety he provides in Part I, form the basis of his analysis of moral judgments concerning the actions 
of others. Although Smith notes that “all approbation or disapprobation, of any kind, which can justly be 
bestowed on any action”42 must ultimately stem from judgments regarding motive, which relate to the 
propriety or impropriety of an action, he also acknowledges a certain “irregularity of sentiment”43 which 
often ties our judgments about specific actions to the actual consequences of those actions. Smith sees this 
irregularity as generally beneficial, since it “promote[s]… such changes in the external circumstances 
both of [the moral agent] and others, as may seem most favorable to the happiness of all”44 and contrib-
utes to the general well-being of society and the agents who comprise it. Judgments of merit and demerit 
thus play a crucial role Smith’s the theory of other-regarding moral judgments, even though he takes 
judgments of propriety and impropriety to be more fundamental.  
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So far, I have only mentioned the other-regarding aspects of Smith’s moral theory, which are fair-
ly similar to those present in other classic sentimentalist theories of morality, such Hume and Hutche-
son’s. However, unlike Hume and Hutcheson, Smith goes into extensive detail about self-regarding moral 
judgments, which captures much of what Korsgaard thinks gives morality its normative force. 45 Most of 
Smith’s discussion of self-regarding moral judgment takes place in Part III of the Theory of Moral Senti-
ments. Much like Korsgaard, Smith thinks that reflection about our moral behavior splits the self into two 
parts: a reflective self and an active self.46 The spectator, or reflective self, reflects on norms for one’s 
actions and delivers its judgment to the agent, or active self. The norms administered by this spectator 
contain judgments of the propriety or impropriety of one’s potential actions, which are derived from how 
other people might perceive those actions and the emotional state motivating them. The guiding principles 
of other-regarding moral judgments that Smith establishes in Parts I and II thus substantially inform the 
content of our self-regarding moral judgments. 
Near the very beginning of Part III, Smith gives a clear summary of how he thinks self-regarding 
moral reflection usually works:  
We endeavor to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator 
would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves in his situation, we thoroughly enter into all the pas-
sions and motives which influenced it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation of this 
supposed equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into his disapprobation, and condemn it.47   
 
As this passage shows, Smith thinks that the practice of self-regarding moral reflection essentially in-
volves observing our actions and emotions from a sufficiently impartial standpoint and judging them the 
way we would judge the same actions or emotions if experienced by someone else. This process is more 
analogous to watching a play based around our lives and determining how much we sympathize with our 
own actions and motives than it is to determining if our actions and motives are in accordance with a ra-
tional law of some sort.48 Thus, the impartial spectator described in the above passage is not simply an 
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“ideal observer” or a theoretical construct meant to perform some kind of utilitarian calculus.49 Instead, 
Smith’s impartial spectator plays a role analogous to that of the conscience in folk psychology; it is the 
part of us that examines our moral behavior and passes judgment upon it. 50 The impartial spectator holds 
us to an extraordinarily high standard of behavior. As Smith notes, “if we saw ourselves in the light in 
which others see us, or in which they would see us if they knew all, a reformation [in our moral behavior] 
would generally be unavoidable. We could not otherwise endure the sight”.51  
It is important to distinguish between the self-regarding moral judgments made by the impartial 
spectator, or “the man within,” and the other-regarding moral judgments directed at oneself made by other 
people in one’s social environment, or “the man without.” As Smith notes, “the jurisdiction of the man 
without, is founded altogether in the desire of actual praise, and in the aversion to actual blame.”52 On the 
other hand:  
…The jurisdiction of the man within, is founded altogether in the desire of praise-worthiness, 
and in the aversion to blame-worthiness; in the desire of possessing those qualities, and perform-
ing those actions, which we love and admire in other people; and in the dread of possessing those 
qualities, and performing those actions, which we hate and despise in other people.53  
 
Thus, while other people assign praise or blame to our specific actions, the impartial spectator assigns 
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness to the moral agent as such. When we consult the impartial spectator, 
we are not just trying to determine if a specific action is good or bad in itself, but are also trying to deter-
mine whether performing that action would make us a good or bad person.  The general question we ask 
the impartial spectator is: “Should I approve of this action or emotion if someone else performs or dis-
plays it in this situation?” Although Smith thinks that actual praise and blame are judgments of the 
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness of another person’s actions, we do not always assign them justly, 
since we have limited epistemic access to the full range of actions and motives that constitute other peo-
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ple’s moral lives.54 Because we are consciously aware of our own actions and motives and have a sense of 
self based upon those actions and motives, the impartial spectator is able to gain more information about 
those actions and motives than anyone else and, thus, pronounce more accurate judgments of our praise-
worthiness or blameworthiness than other people.  
Smith thinks that we put the judgments of the impartial spectator into practice through exercising 
the virtue of self-command. He sees self-command as the ability to control one’s own passions in order to 
live and act in accordance with the norms administered by the impartial spectator and describes as essen-
tially the foundation of all the other virtues, such as prudence, justice, and beneficence. As he puts it, 
“self-command is not only itself a great virtue, but from it all the other virtues seem to derive their princi-
pal lustre.” 55 We exercise self-command whenever we adjust our emotional responses and behavior to fit 
the norms administered the impartial spectator. While this process usually involves conscious reflection, 
it can also happen almost instantaneously, depending on the passion that’s being controlled. The exercise 
of self-command consists in three distinct stages:  
1) We feel an immediate passion in response to some element in our environment.  
2) We consider the propriety or impropriety of this passion from the perspective of the impartial 
spectator.  
3) We “switch gears” to the passion that would be most proper or fitting, given our current cir-
cumstance.  
Smith thinks that self-command is something that we must continually work to acquire through 
constant practice and constant attention to the judgments of the impartial spectator. While this process has 
its roots in a young child’s or infant’s response to discipline from adults, one genuinely “enters into the 
great school of self-command” when one is “old enough to go to school, or to mix with [one’s] equals.” 56 
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Thus, the process of acquiring self-command seems to be directly linked to participating in a social envi-
ronment amongst peers who are not necessarily favorably disposed or sympathetic to one’s own point of 
view. In the middle of the third chapter of Part III, Smith outlines a possible trajectory for the acquisition 
of self-command, starting with a description of a young child who displays no self-command at all and 
ending with a description of a “wise and just man who has been thoroughly bred in the great school of 
self-command.”57A key thread that ties these portraits together is attention to the impartial spectator. A 
weak man who does not possess much self-command or a well-developed notion of the impartial specta-
tor can pull himself together when other people are present, but completely abandons himself to his emo-
tions when he’s alone. 58 By contrast, a “man of real constancy and firmness” pays such great attention to 
the impartial spectator that he might be said to “almost become… [the] impartial spectator.”59 The norms 
administered by the impartial spectator are so thoroughly entrenched in him that he rarely considers him-
self outside of his relations to other people and almost never experiences emotions or undertakes actions 
that might be considered to be improper, given his circumstances.  
Now that I have outlined the main components of Smith’s moral theory, I will discuss how Smith 
can meet Korsgaard’s three conditions and successfully avoid “knavish lawyer” cases. If Smith can di-
rectly address reflective agents faced with a moral decision, provide us with transparent reasons for ac-
tion, and appeal to our deep sense of self-worth, then he will have met all the conditions Korsgaard thinks 
a moral theory must meet to answer the normative question. If his moral theory is not threatened by 
“knavish lawyer” cases, then it will be immune to what Korsgaard takes to be the strongest objection to 
other sentimentalist theories of morality, such as Hume’s. Thus, if I establish that Smith’s moral theory 
can meet Korsgaard’s three conditions and is not threatened by “knavish lawyer” cases, then we can safe-
ly assume that it answers the normative question and does so in a way that Korsgaard does not find inher-
ently problematic.   
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3.2. Adam Smith and the Reflective Agent  
In Section 2.2, I argued that Korsgaard’s first condition, which states that moral theories must di-
rectly address a reflective moral agent in order to answer the normative question, can be rephrased as 
claiming that moral theories must provide agents with reasons for acting morally that those agents can 
identify with when they reflect on those reasons from a second-order perspective. Thus, in order for 
Smith’s moral theory to meet this condition, it must meet two sub-conditions. First, Smith must place our 
capacity for second-order reflection at the center of his discussion of moral deliberation. Second, Smith 
must give a detailed account of how our capacity for second-order moral reflection can provide us with 
norms capable of guiding our actions. If Smith’s theory meets these sub-conditions, it can likely generate 
the direct reasons for acting morally that a reflective agent who asks the normative question seeks access 
to. We can then safely assume that Smith is not trying to trick us into moral and is attempting to engage 
us as the reflective agents that we are and take ourselves to be in everyday life.  
The first sub-condition is easy for Smith to meet. As I discussed in Section 3.1, an account of re-
flection and selfhood similar to Korsgaard’s forms the cornerstone of Smith’s theory of self-regarding 
moral judgment. Much like Korsgaard, Smith thinks that self-regarding moral reflection necessarily splits 
the self into two parts: a reflective component, which he calls the spectator, and an active component, 
which he calls the agent.60 The specific sort of moral reflection that the spectator engages in primarily 
involves evaluating whether or not one can sympathize with the motives and passions that underwrite a 
given action. 61 This sort of evaluation then produces a judgment of approbation or disapprobation. Since 
the process of reflecting on one’s motives and passions ultimately results in a judgment about whether or 
not one should want to act on those and passions, it seems fair to say that second-order reflection is cen-
tral to Smith’s account of moral reflection.   
 Although Smith’s specific response to the second sub-condition substantially differs from 
Korsgaard’s, the basic structure of his response is similar enough to her desired approach to meet it. As I 
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mentioned in Section 2.1, Korsgaard’s account of moral reflection involves the reflective component of 
the self administering norms to the active component of the self, which take the form of good moral max-
ims. Smith’s moral theory posits a similar overall structure of moral reflection, in which the impartial 
spectator administers norms that the moral agent acts on, but sharply diverges from Korsgaard’s theory 
with respect to the exact sort of norms that the reflective component of the self administers. Unlike 
Korsgaard, Smith claims that the norms that in question are emotional judgments of approbation and dis-
approbation, which are grounded in facts about the situation that is being reflected upon. These judgments 
are not universally applicable in all situations and, thus, need not take the form of maxims that can be 
willed as universal laws.  
If the norms that Smith claims the impartial spectator administers do not take the form of univer-
sal reasons that anyone can share in, then how can they gain any sort of normative force over a reflective 
moral agent? It is a bit easier to see how the impartial spectator’s judgments can obligate us to act in a 
certain way if we look at Smith’s discussion of remorse, which he takes to be an especially bad form of 
self-disapprobation. According to Smith, when “the violator of the more sacred laws of justice”62 (which, 
in this case, would be a murderer or a thief or a promise-breaker63) reflects on his past misdeeds in a suf-
ficiently fair and impartial light, his life becomes a living nightmare. As Smith observes:  
[Someone who is guilty of such an offense] dares no longer look society in the face, but imagines 
himself as if he were rejected, and thrown out from the affections of all mankind. He cannot hope 
for the consolation of sympathy in this his greatest and most dreadful distress. The remembrance 
of his crimes has shut out all fellow-feeling with him from the hearts of his fellow-creatures. The 
sentiments which they entertain with regard to him, are the very thing he is most afraid of. Every 
thing seems hostile, and he would be glad to fly to some inhospitable desert, where he might nev-
er behold the face of a human creature, nor read in the countenance of mankind the condemnation 
of his crimes.64  
 
Since Smith admits from the very start of his book that we are naturally social creatures who desire to 
perform actions that others can sympathize with and approve of,65 the knowledge that one has acted in a 
                                                          
62
 TMS II.ii.ii.3. 
63
 TMS II.ii.ii.2. 
64
 TMS II.ii.ii.3. 
65
 TMS I.i.1.1. 
24 
 
genuinely blameworthy manner and is thus the proper object of moral resentment exacts a heavy emo-
tional toll on anyone who suffers from remorse, even if he is never exposed to actual blame for his ac-
tions. Presumably, no one in her right mind would wish to experience an emotion of the sort that Smith 
describes in the above passage; the emotional costs are simply too great. Since this is the case, the emo-
tional judgments of approbation and disapprobation that the impartial spectator administers should clearly 
be able to exert the sort of normative force over us that Korsgaard associates with the norms administered 
by the thinking self.  
Since Smith both places our capacity for second-order reflection at the center of his discussion of 
moral deliberation and gives a detailed account of how our capacity for moral reflection provides us with 
norms capable of guiding our actions, it seems fair to say that his moral theory can directly address a re-
flective moral agent faced with a moral decision. For Smith, reflection and moral agency are very closely 
linked and, furthermore, the sorts of judgments that form the content of moral reflection according to his 
theory can exert a great deal of normative force over our behavior. As a result, the moral theory Smith 
defends in the Theory of Moral Sentiments is capable of meeting Korsgaard’s first condition for a satisfac-
tory answer to the normative question.  
 
3.3. The Impartial Spectator’s Transparent Reasons 
 Although I’ve just established that Adam Smith’s moral theory can meet Korsgaard’s first condi-
tion for a response to answer the normative question, I still have to show that his moral theory can provide 
transparent reasons for acting morally: reasons that do not depend on the moral agent being left in the 
dark about what the real purpose of morality is. This is a harder condition for Smith’s theory to meet than 
the first condition, since Korsgaard does not think that reasons for moral action grounded in our emotion-
al states are sufficient for justifying the normative claims that morality makes on us.66 Thus, in addition to 
demonstrating that Smith’s theory can provide the sort of transparent reasons for acting morally that 
Korsgaard is interested in, I will have to show how Smith’s theory can avoid this specific objection. 
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 As I argued in Section 2.2, Korsgaard’s condition that a theory of morality provide transparent 
reasons for action draws heavily on her commitment to moral internalism, which she interprets as stating 
that “the reason why [an] action is right is a reason for doing it.”67 Once we view Korsgaard’s interest in 
transparency in this light, it is fairly easy to see how Smith’s moral theory can provide the sort of trans-
parent reasons that Korsgaard requires. Much like the other classical sentimentalists, Smith claims that an 
action is right to perform just in case an impartial spectator would approve of it. 68 For Smith, “the very 
words, right, wrong, fit, improper, graceful, unbecoming, mean only what pleases or displeases [our] fac-
ulties [of moral judgment].”69 As I showed in Section 3.1, these faculties consist of a reflective aspect of 
oneself that views the actions performed by oneself and others from an impartial perspective and attempts 
to sympathize with those actions. This alone does not substantially differentiate Smith’s moral theory 
from Hume’s. However, as Gilbert Harman notes, Smith’s account of moral motivation strongly differs 
from Hume’s and is, in fact, strongly preferable to Hume’s. According to Hume, a moral agent is “con-
cerned with the reactions of others because he or she wants them to continue dealing with him or her.”70 
This clearly cannot provide the sorts of transparent reasons for moral action that Korsgaard is interested 
in. If we act morally because we want others to like us, then we will inevitably run into “knavish lawyer” 
cases, in which moral claims fail to exert normative force over us whenever we have the opportunity to 
act immorally without anyone noticing that we have done so.71  
 Smith, on the other hand, provides a much more nuanced and plausible theory of moral motiva-
tion, since he claims that our inherent desire for praiseworthiness is what ultimately makes us want to act 
morally.72 Since judgments of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness are ultimately grounded in the impar-
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tial spectator’s approval or disapproval, the impartial spectator’s judgment that an action is praiseworthy 
both makes that action right to perform and motivates the moral agent to perform that action. For Smith, 
then, the reason why an action is right and the reason why an agent is motivated to perform that action are 
one and the same. This captures what Korsgaard takes to be the most attractive element of moral 
internalism and also guarantees that the impartial spectator can provide transparent reasons to moral 
agents. Smith does not say that morally good actions are right to perform because they have a generally 
have useful consequences or because they tend to cause other people to like us. Instead, he claims that 
morally good actions are right to perform because we can fully sympathize with those actions and be mo-
tivated to perform them when we observe those actions from a sufficiently impartial perspective. The rea-
sons for moral action that the impartial spectator can provide us with are thus quite transparent; do not 
represent an attempt to trick us into being moral or attempt to justify moral behavior in a manner that a 
reflective agent could not fully support.  
 Korsgaard might respond to this line of argument by claiming that Smith’s theory still gives us 
room to question the validity of the emotional responses that would lead the impartial spectator to view 
our actions as praiseworthy or blameworthy in the first place. This would result in a slightly more sophis-
ticated variant of the “knavish lawyer” case in which the lawyer knows that acting immorally would make 
her blameworthy, but does not think that viewing herself as blameworthy is a particularly bad thing, aside 
from the obvious emotional costs involved. My tentative response to this potential criticism is that in the 
aforementioned scenario, the lawyer would be viewing her decision from a faulty, partial perspective and 
thus, would not have fully consulted the impartial spectator in the first place. As I noted in Section 3.1, 
Smith thinks that viewing one’s behavior as an impartial spectator would is a skill that often takes a life-
time to develop and admits that the ability to do so widely varies between different people. If the lawyer 
in my revised example does not think that it is genuinely bad to act in a morally blameworthy manner and 
has difficulty exercising self-command, then her moral growth is likely stunted, which means that she has 
trouble viewing her actions from the perspective of an impartial spectator.  
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 Given these considerations, the problem in the revised “knavish lawyer” case is not that that the 
impartial spectator’s judgments cannot, by principle, provide transparent reasons for action, since they are 
grounded in emotional responses. Instead, the problem is that the lawyer has not developed the sort of 
moral skill necessary to give the impartial spectator’s judgments their due importance. For Smith, paying 
attention to the impartial spectator’s judgments and exercising self-command mutually reinforce each 
other, thus making the reasons that the impartial spectator gives for moral action fully transparent. Further 
reflection on the impartial spectator’s judgments of approbation or disapprobation will only lead an agent 
to be more motivated to act based on them, which further illustrates how the impartial spectator provides 
the sort of transparent reasons for moral action that Korsgaard requires.  
.  
3.4. Adam Smith on Morality and Self-Worth 
In Section 2.2, I claimed that Korsgaard’s third condition, which states that a good moral theory 
must appeal to our deep sense of self, could be met in a variety of different ways. Korsgaard’s attempt to 
meet it involves an appeal to the norms implicit in practical identities we adopt in our everyday lives, 
which she think we only adopt insofar as we take ourselves to be reflective agents. This leads her to make 
a transcendental argument claiming that in order to act at all, we must value our capacity for reflection 
and, thus, both our own humanity and the humanity of others. In the conclusion of this thesis, I will dis-
cuss some potential weaknesses in this strategy, but for now, I would like to focus on how Adam Smith’s 
moral theory can appeal to our deep sense of self and, in doing so, answer the last of the three conditions 
Korsgaard thinks a satisfactory answer to the normative question must meet.  
Instead of providing the sort of transcendental argument Korsgaard is interested in, Smith uses 
rhetoric to directly engage with the reader and prompt him or her to act morally. Smith elucidates his use 
of this practice towards the very end of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, when he discusses how ancient 
moralists, such as Cicero and Aristotle, attempt to encourage moral behavior through proper use of rheto-
ric. As Smith notes:  
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By the vivacity of their descriptions [the ancient moralists] inflame our natural love of virtue, and 
increase our abhorrence of vice; by the justness as well as delicacy of their observations they may 
often help both to correct and to ascertain our natural sentiments with regard to the propriety of 
conduct.73  
 
Smith’s use of rhetoric in the Theory of Moral Sentiments has a great deal in common with the ancient 
moralists he discusses in the above passage. Like the ancient moralists, Smith devotes much of his book 
to painting intricate portraits of virtue and vice, as we might encounter them in our everyday lives, and 
uses these portraits to increase our knowledge of how to act morally.  
Take, for instance, the passage I mentioned in Section 3.1 where Smith discusses a possible tra-
jectory for the acquisition of self-command. In that passage, Smith describes several different people who 
display different amounts of self-command and implicitly asks us which one we would most want to emu-
late. Do we want to be like the “weak man,” who in the face of distress, “abandons himself… to slights 
and tears and lamentations”74 or the “man of real constancy and firmness” who “maintains… control of 
his passive feelings upon all occasions?”75 Smith thinks that the answer is obvious if we reflect on the 
portraits he presents: we want to be like the latter person. Since Smith takes himself to be engaging in this 
sort of direct dialogue with the reader, it is not much of a stretch to claim that his Theory of Moral Senti-
ments is written in such a way to make the reader strongly identify with moral behavior and, by doing do, 
appeal to the reader’s deep sense of self.  
Smith’s use of rhetoric in this manner echoes the way in which the impartial spectator provides us 
with reasons to act morally. For example, in the passage on remorse that I discussed in Section 3.2, Smith 
notes that a person who experiences remorse “imagines himself as if he were rejected, and thrown out 
from the affections of all mankind,”76 since “the remembrance of his crimes [shuts] out all fellow-feeling 
him from the hearts of his fellow-creatures.”77 The judgment of extreme blameworthiness that the impar-
tial spectator administers in this situation thus takes the form of a vividly imagined scenario in which the 
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agent’s concealed behavior, to his horror, gets the exact response that it properly warrants from others. 
The sense of self-worth and membership in the greater moral community that the agent values is threat-
ened by his former actions, which he presumably would not have performed if he had known that they 
would threaten his self-worth in this way. Examples of this sort clearly illustrate how the impartial specta-
tor has the power to appeal to the agent’s deep sense of self and how this sort of appeal helps give the im-
partial spectator’s judgments strong normative force.  
Since Smith’s moral theory is able to address a moral agent faced with a decision, provide trans-
parent reasons for moral action, and appeal to the agent’s deep sense of self, it meets all three of the con-
ditions that Korsgaard thinks a satisfactory answer to the normative question must meet. Adam Smith can 
therefore satisfactorily answer the normative question. However, if this is the case, then Smith’s moral 
theory must be able to avoid the “knavish lawyer” cases that, according to Korsgaard, highlight a serious 
deficiency in sentimentalist theories of morality. In the next section, I will turn back to Korsgaard’s knav-
ish lawyer thought experiment and show why it does not pose a challenge to Smith’s view. 
 
3.5. Justificatory Adequcy in Adam Smith’s Moral Theory  
In Section 2.3, I discussed how Korsgaard’s “knavish lawyer” thought experiment reveals what 
she takes to be a major flaw in sentimentalist moral theories: they allow for a moral agent to act morally 
without truly believing that “the claims our moral feelings make on her… are well-grounded.”78 When the 
lawyer reflects on her decision not to destroy the will, she does not feel as though she can fully identify 
with or justify it; instead, she acts as she does simply because she is overwhelmed by pro-social emotions. 
Although this results in good behavior on her part, the lawyer’s emotions do not provide her with trans-
parent, normative reasons to act a certain way and certainly do not appeal to her capacity to reflect on 
moral norms and identify with them. All this, for Korsgaard, is indicative of a failure to answer the nor-
mative question. Thus, if Adam Smith can answer the normative question, his moral theory should be able 
to avoid “knavish lawyer” cases, in which an agent’s moral behavior ultimately springs from emotions 
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over which the agent has little control. The impartial spectator’s dictates must be transparent and must be 
the sorts of reasons for actions that a reflective agent can identify with in a second-order sense.  
 As I have hopefully shown in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, Smith’s moral theory does, in fact, differ from 
Hume’s in ways that allow it to respond better to “knavish lawyer” cases. As Korsgaard admits, Smith 
“takes the agent to act from specifically moral thoughts”79 that originate from a reflective perspective, 
thus making his theory “more sensitive to the perspective of the agent than those of his predecessors.”80 
Korsgaard still finds Smith’s theory of moral normativity faulty compared to Kant’s, though, because un-
like Kant, Smith takes projected emotional judgments of approbation or disapprobation generated by an 
internalized spectator to form the basis of moral clams. This seems to entail a primarily other-directed 
moral theory, which reduces morality to conditioned emotional responses that one can always choose to 
ignore or try to overcome. However, as I discussed in Section 3.1, Smith views self-regarding judgments 
as the ultimate source of moral normativity and in fact accords more normative weight to them than he 
does to other-regarding judgments directed towards oneself by members of one’s community.  
Smith’s moral theory can thus give a much stronger response to “knavish lawyer” cases than 
Hume’s can. If Korsgaard’s lawyer were to consult Smith’s impartial spectator, she would gain transpar-
ent norms for action that she could identify with upon reflection. Most likely, those norms would take the 
form of the lawyer imagining hearing about someone else – a colleague, perhaps – destroying a valid will 
and identifying with the resentment she would feel regarding this breach of professional ethics. A lawyer 
who destroys her client’s will fragrantly violates the norms implicit in the lawyer-client relationship and, 
thus, fully deserves the blame and disapprobation of her colleagues. As Smith’s discussion of remorse 
nicely illustrates, knowing that one is properly blameworthy for an immoral action is a punishment in its 
own right; it is something that any reflective agent would be strongly motivated to avoid. Thus, far from 
being held captive by her emotions, the knavish lawyer who consults the impartial spectator will have 
clear reasons to refrain from destroying her client’s will that she can fully identify with upon reflection. 
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Those reasons will not be externally imposed on the lawyer by forces outside her control and, by appeal-
ing to the lawyer’s deep sense of self-worth, will often suffice to make the lawyer genuinely want to not 
destroy the will.  
Korsgaard might argue in response to this claim that the knavish lawyer can still ask why the 
moral judgments produced by the impartial spectator are worth following in the first place. The lawyer is, 
after all, knavish, so judgments about the importance of following a code of professional ethics and treat-
ing one’s clients with respect might fall on deaf ears in her case. As I noted in Section 3.3, however, if the 
lawyer takes this attitude towards the judgments of the impartial spectator, she probably has not viewed 
her behavior from a sufficiently impartial perspective, which, for Smith, means that she has failed to 
properly consult the impartial spectator in the first place. This is roughly equivalent to the knavish lawyer 
opening up a copy of The Sources of Normativity, starting to read the third lecture, and casting the book 
aside for some arbitrary reason.  
Korsgaard cannot say anything to an agent who does not want to listen to her and neither can 
Smith’s impartial spectator. However, Smith can arguably say more than Korsgaard about why it’s im-
portant to pay attention to moral claims, which makes his response to this particular sort of concern more 
attractive. As I mentioned in Sections 3.1 and 3.4, Smith frequently presents his readers with scenarios 
from everyday life that illustrate the importance of consulting the impartial spectator and exercising self-
command. Smith employs this rhetorical strategy in part because he thinks it mirrors the natural process 
by which we acquire the capacity to view our actions from an impartial perspective and act in a morally 
correct manner. Thus, for Smith, simply living in society and desiring to gain the approval of one’s peers 
is usually sufficient to motivate an agent to act morally. Korsgaard, however, presents her answer to nor-
mative question in the form of a detailed reconstruction of an argument she takes Kant to have made in 
the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Although this argument ultimately claims that our every-
day interactions with others imply a commitment to morality, Korsgaard says very little about why we 
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should ultimately want to pay attention to her argument in the first place.81 This leaves a great deal of 
room for real-life “knavish lawyers” to reject Korsgaard’s argument, even if she does succeed in provid-
ing an adequate response to their concerns (thus making the “knavish lawyers” in question irrational as 
well as knavish). Since Smith relies less heavily on explicit argumentation to make his case for moral 
normativity, his moral theory makes fewer theoretical demands on the moral agent who consults it than 
Korsgaard’s theory. Smith’s potential response to “knavish lawyer” cases is thus fully adequate in the 
sense that Korsgaard specifies and is even preferable to Korsgaard’s own response in some ways.  
4. CONCLUSION 
Now that I have demonstrated that Adam Smith’s moral theory can answer the normative question, I 
would like to conclude by briefly examining the upshot of Smith’s answer. As I noted at various points in 
Chapter 3, Smith’s moral theory differs from Korsgaard’s in several respects, despite its many similarities 
to the “appeal to autonomy” that Korsgaard thinks provides the strongest answer to the normative ques-
tion. Some of these differences actually make Smith’s answer to the normative question more attractive 
than Korsgaard’s, since they exempt his theory from some of the stronger criticisms of Korsgaard’s theo-
ry of moral normativity in the current literature. I will now discuss two of these criticisms and show how 
Smith might be able to respond to them.  
In his review of The Sources of Normativity,82 Michael Bratman targets Korsgaard’s claim that 
any reflective endorsement of a specific action requires an endorsement of a general principle or universal 
law that would support us acting that way. According to Korsgaard, we must necessarily act as a unified 
agent, instead of a bundle of desires and inclinations motivated by causal forces outside of our control. 
Korsgaard thinks that the proverbial “glue” that holds together our self-conception as agents is our en-
dorsement of universal laws that guide our actions. Bratman, however, claims that we can arrive at the 
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sort of unified agency Korsgaard deems essential for action without endorsing any universal law of that 
sort and defends this claim against two permutations of Korsgaard’s view. If we’re more interested in our 
unified agency in the moment of action, then Bratman notes that it is possible to act in a unified way in 
one situation (and to reflectively endorse this action) without endorsing the same sorts of actions in other 
situations. If we’re more interested in our commitment to future courses of action, then it is possible to 
make a decision about the future and then change one’s mind at a later date. Either way, Bratman thinks 
that one can act as a unified agent without using the sort of universal laws Korsgaard is interested in de-
fending. If it is possible to act as a unified agent without endorsing a moral maxim in the form of a uni-
versal law, then Korsgaard’s transcendental argument is substantially weakened. The sorts of norms that 
Korsgaard claims the thinking self administers are not “implicit in every human choice,”83 which means 
that her strategy for establishing their authority over us cannot be entirely successful.  
Bratman’s criticism highlights a major difficulty implicit in Korsgaard’s claim that moral norms 
take the form of maxims that can be willed as universal laws: sometimes, we accept reasons for moral 
action that are not universally applicable in all similar cases, but can still guide our actions in a satisfacto-
ry manner. It would seem, then, that a moral theory that answers the normative question should make 
room for these sorts of norms and explain how they can both show us why something is right to do and 
motivate us to do it. As it happens, Smith addresses this concern very well in his discussion of general 
rules in Part III of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. For Smith, general rules are typically common-sense 
guidelines for behavior such as “don’t kill anyone”84 or “don’t cheat on your spouse”85 that more or less 
anyone would accept as action-guiding, since to not do so would result in social disorder.86 General rules 
play a similar role to Korsgaard’s moral maxims insofar as they direct us to act out of a “sense of duty”87 
and provide us with clear guidelines for action that universally apply to all similar cases.88 However, 
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Smith does not think that general rules are derived from purely rational consideration of the merits of any 
given sort of action. Instead, Smith thinks that general rules are established “by finding from experience, 
that all actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved or disapproved of.”89 
Since this is the case, the impartial spectator’s judgments about specific cases play a large role in forming 
general rules and following those general rules in the future. The universal applicability of the norms that 
guide our actions is thus much less important for Smith than it is for Korsgaard, which helps protect his 
theory from Bratman’s criticism.  
In “Morality as Consistency in Living: Korsgaard’s Kantian Lectures,”90 Alan Gibbard presents a 
similar, yet broader, critique of Korsgaard’s theory of moral normativity.  Gibbard’s chief objection is 
that Korsgaard relies too much on what he calls “moral logicism:” the view that knowledge of the implicit 
logic of agency is sufficient for deriving the rules of morality. This commitment to moral logicism leads 
Korsgaard to adopt the overly-ambitious transcendental argument I discussed in the previous section. Ac-
cording to Gibbard, the reach of such an argument far exceeds its grasp, which dooms Korsgaard’s project 
to certain failure. Take, for instance, Korsgaard’s assumption that adopting any practical identity whatso-
ever entails adopting the practical identity of a reflective agent.91 Gibbard notes that adopting some prac-
tical identities does not necessarily imply that I adopt the practical identity of a reflective agent.  For in-
stance, if I adopt the practical identity of an Achaean warrior and thus value courage on the battlefield 
above all else, then there is no need for me to value my humanity and others’ humanity. Adopting that 
practical identity only implies that I value protecting my friends and killing my enemies and the sort of 
moral reflection Korsgaard is interested in might actually conflict with these duties. Korsgaard’s tran-
scendental argument is thus weaker than she thinks. Adopting practical identities, sharing in reasons, and 
other everyday human activities don’t necessarily entail the sort of strong claims about morality she wish-
es to make, at least when considered logically.  
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Gibbard’s critique draws out a serious weakness in her approach to establishing the normativity 
of morality: if just one step of Korsgaard’s transcendental argument doesn’t work, her entire argument is 
flawed and morality cannot be shown to be normative after all. Much like Bratman’s criticism, however, 
Gibbard’s critique does not apply to Smith’s theory of morality, since Smith never claims to produce a 
watertight argument that will refute moral skepticism once and for all. All Smith aims to do is point to-
wards some elements of our emotional phenomenology and our day-to-day interactions with other people, 
note what tends to be at stake in those emotions and interactions, and show us we can live happier lives 
and have better interactions with other people based on this information. Whether or not the normativity 
of morality can be established through a transcendental argument is thus irrelevant to Smith, even though 
he gives an account of moral judgment similar to Korsgaard’s and is committed to similar views about the 
ultimate source of moral normativity.92  
 Adam Smith’s answer to the normative question is an attractive one. It is consistent with many of 
the theoretical insights that inform Korsgaard’s interest in reflective agency and practical identity, but at 
the same time manages to avoid Korsgaard’s reliance on universal moral maxims and transcendental ar-
gumentation, instead grounding the normativity of morality in our ability to sympathize with other people 
and view our own actions from an impartial perspective. Furhtermore, Smith’s theory captures the norma-
tive, self-regarding element of ethics in a much more pronounced way than most classical or contempo-
rary sentimentalist moral theories,93 it can still make a substantive contribution to contemporary ethical 
debates.  
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